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Does Legality Matter? The Case of Tax Avoidance and Evasion 





Previous research argues that the law expresses social values and could, therefore, influence individual 
behavior independently of enforcement and penalization. Using three laboratory experiments on tax 
avoidance and evasion, we study how legality affects individuals’ decisions. We find that, without any risk 
of negative financial consequences, the qualification of tax minimization as illegal versus legal reduces tax 
minimization considerably. Legislators can thus, in principle, affect subjects’ decisions by defining the line 
between legality and illegality. However, once we introduce potential negative financial consequences, we 
observe no difference between legal and illegal tax minimization behavior. Only if we use moral priming 
to increase subjects’ moral cost do we again find a legality effect on tax minimization. Overall, this 
demonstrates the limitations of the expressive function of the law. Legality might be an important 
determinant of behavior only if we consider activities with little or no risk of negative financial 
consequences or if subjects are morally primed. 
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How can legality affect individual decision making? The answer to this question is important for a variety 
of individual decisions. Still, very little is empirically known about the effectiveness of changing the legality 
of actions on actual behavior. Whereas the early law and economics literature focused on the effects of 
legal sanctions (imperative function of law, Posner 1981), a growing body of literature interprets legal rules 
as part of the social norms system. In other words, people follow norms for reasons other than the sole fear 
of legal sanction (Stout 2006), for example, because of socialization (Ellickson 1998) or an increase of 
endowment from voluntary compliance after an initial threat of sanction (DePianto 2014). The legality or 
illegality of an action is an explicit way for policy makers to affect the social acceptance of this action 
(expressive function of law, Sunstein 1996). Law expresses social values and legality may act as a reference 
point when individuals rationalize their decisions (Cooter 1998, 2000). This expressive function of law may 
work independently of the enforcement and penalization of illegal actions (McAdams 2000). For example, 
the possession of cannabis is illegal in most countries, but many countries do not prosecute the possession 
of small amounts. Abortion is another example. In some countries illegal abortions are not or have not been 
prosecuted, often depending on the stage of pregnancy and other circumstances (“laws that symbolically 
oppose abortion,” McAdams 2000, p. 363). We contribute to this theoretical debate and empirically test 
whether declaring a specific action—in our case tax minimization—as illegal affects individual decisions, 
even if illegal actions are not penalized. 
Legality is important in many individual decisions, but is of particular importance in the case of taxation, 
since taxation affects (almost) all individuals in a society and represents a major revenue source for 
governments. However, the legality of tax minimization behavior is unclear, since the line between legal 
and illegal tax actions is often blurred and differs across countries. Still, policy makers appear to use legality 
to affect individual decisions and thus ultimately tax revenues. For example, a key tax reform proposal 
element of the new Greek government during the recent sovereign debt crisis has been to “broaden [the] 
definition of tax fraud and evasion.”3 In general, tax avoidance and tax evasion are alternative methods of 
reducing taxes (Stiglitz 1985; Alm 1988a; Neck et al. 2012) that differ in their lawfulness: Tax avoidance 
describes activities within the boundaries of the law, whereas tax evasion is illegal. Individuals as well as 
corporations may anchor the rationalization of their reporting decisions on the legality of tax minimization 
strategies. Qualification of a tax avoidance opportunity as lawful could cause less tension between 
individuals’ self-concept and their tax minimization actions. 
                                                 
3  See the letter of Yanis Varoufakis, Minister of Finance to the President of the Eurogroup, February 25, 2015. 
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Several studies compare tax with non-tax situations (e.g., Alm et al. 1992, Durham et al. 2014) but there is 
very little empirical research on the effect of legality on tax minimization behavior. In a perception study, 
Kirchler et al. (2003) show that the respondents perceived tax evasion as illegal and immoral and associated 
it with fraud, criminal prosecution, risk, tax audits, and penalties. In contrast, they perceived tax avoidance 
as legal and moral, associated it with cleverness, and considered it a good idea. In addition, the survey of 
Bobek and Hatfield (2003) indicates that engaging in an illegal behavior leads to a “psychic cost” that 
influences taxpayers’ attitude to a larger extent than concerns about penalties. Dwenger et al. (2015) provide 
field evidence of a significant percentage of subjects who do not evade any taxes in a zero deterrence setting. 
However, there is no empirical evidence on the effect of legality on real tax minimization decisions. We 
contribute to the literature on the role of legality in individual decision making processes by examining 
empirically how and when legality affects an individual’s tax minimization decisions. 
The key challenge when examining this research question is finding a suitable empirical setting. Since tax 
evasion is not observable in archival data and not fully observable in administrative tax data even if the data 
are merged with audit data, we address this research question in a series of experiments.4 Despite the usual 
concerns about external validity, an experimental approach has obvious advantages in answering our 
research question: We can easily manipulate the legality of a tax minimization opportunity in the lab. We 
can also manipulate whether tax minimization is associated with risky penalties and we can induce moral 
priming. This can hardly be achieved with archival data or even administrative tax data, where tax evasion 
is typically not observable. 
In the first experiment, we compare tax minimization behavior in the absence of any detection or penalty 
risk. Subjects earned money in a real effort task and faced either a legal or an illegal tax minimization 
opportunity. Based on a simple theoretic approach, we predict that the illegal opportunity causes higher 
moral costs than legal opportunity does (see Appendix I). In line with that theory, we find that labeling a 
tax minimization opportunity as unambiguously illegal results in significantly less tax minimization 
compared to labeling tax minimization as unambiguously licit, even though there is no penalty or detection. 
This finding is also consistent with the perceptions documented by Bobek and Hatfield (2003) and Kirchler 
et al. (2003). Importantly, the effects are economically large. In the legal treatment, the average tax 
minimization is close to the maximum amount, indicating that moral costs do not play an important role. 
Tax minimization is reduced by over 50% if a subject is in the illegal treatment. More generally, this finding 
                                                 
4  Researchers are increasingly gaining access to audit data—for example, Kleven et al. (2011),  Pomeranz (2015), 
Slemrod et al. (2001), and Slemrod (2007) with discussions on the Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program). 
However, one still needs to acknowledge that an audit may not unveil the true extent of tax evasion, for example, 
because the results of an audit also depend on the qualification and motivation of tax auditors (Feinstein 1990). 
Our experiment has the advantage of allowing us to observe the true income and the reported income. 
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is consistent with the expressive function of law. Declaring an action as illegal affects behavior even if the 
illegal action is not penalized. This suggests that engaging in illegal behavior leads to significant moral 
costs and that legislators can thus affect behavior by defining the borderline between legal and illegal 
activities, even if there is no actual possibility of detecting wrongdoing. 
However, in the context of tax minimization, one concern about the first experiment is its external validity. 
Outside the lab, tax evasion is typically associated with positive detection and penalty risk. Moreover, due 
to tax law ambiguity, tax avoidance also bears the risk that the revenue agency will assess an additional 
income tax payment and corresponding interest charges upon audit. The uncertainty in tax avoidance is one 
reason why, for example, according to US Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), firms are 
mandated to report their uncertain, albeit legal tax positions. Therefore, we conduct a second experiment in 
which we compare legal and illegal tax minimization behavior in a setting with detection risk, negative 
detection consequences, and implicit monitoring (penalties in the case of evasion and interest charges in 
the case of avoidance). In this setting, the introduction of penalties reduces tax avoidance, whereas the 
effect on tax evasion is ambiguous. Consequently, the difference between legal and illegal tax minimization 
becomes smaller and may disappear. Correspondingly, we observe no difference between legal and illegal 
tax minimization. Thus, the legality effect could still be present but it is muted by a stronger penalty effect 
once we introduce risky negative detection consequences. This reveals an important limitation of the 
expressive law approach that has not been previously considered. 
There are four possible explanations for this effect: First, participants in the evasion treatment could decide 
to use only a small fraction of the maximum income concealment to maintain their positive self-concept 
(Mazar et al. 2008).  We show that this is not very likely. However, the vast majority of our participants in 
the first experiment evaded either nothing or they evaded the full amount of six sheets. This still holds when 
we introduce penalties and detection risk. Second, by introducing the risk that the tax authority will not 
accept all (legal) tax avoidance strategies, the line between legal and illegal behavior is blurred. Therefore, 
the difference in subjects’ moral evaluations disappears. We conduct a survey to examine this explanation. 
We find that the difference in subjects’ moral evaluations between illegal and legal tax minimization is not 
much affected by the introduction of risk. Hence, the observed results in the second experiment cannot be 
explained by a blurred line between legal and illegal behavior. Third, penalties increase the cognitive load 
of taxpayers (Dohmen et al. 2010). This could reduce the importance of intrinsic preferences for obeying 
the law and reduce the effectiveness of injunctive norms (Kredentser et al. 2012, Dwenger et al. 2015). 
Fourth, interventions such as penalties and the implicit introduction of monitoring could undermine intrinsic 
motivation (Gneezy and Rustichini 2000a, Fehr and Falk 2002, Falk and Kosfeld 2006). Since the first 
experiment shows that legal tax minimization does not lead to significant moral cost but illegal tax 
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minimization does, the crowding out of intrinsic motivation mainly matters for illegal tax minimization 
behavior. 
Our third experiment addresses the crowding out and cognitive load explanations by introducing moral 
priming. In theory, moral priming reduces the crowding out effect and could thereby reinforce the legality 
effect. We use the same setting as in the second experiment and hold the cognitive load constant. However, 
we now use moral priming to increase the moral costs of the illegal activity. Consistent with the argument 
that moral priming reduces crowding out and reinforces the legality effect, we observe a legality effect in 
the third experiment. The average reduction in tax minimization amounts to about 30% if participants are 
morally primed. The effect of legality is therefore still economically significant but weaker than in the 
baseline experiment without risk and moral priming. Furthermore, we interpret this as evidence against the 
cognitive load explanation. 
Taken together, our series of experiments shows that legality can have strong effects on individuals’ 
behavior. In line with the expressive law approach, defining the borderline between legality and illegality 
can be used to affect moral costs. The classical borderline between legality and illegality in taxation is that 
tax evasion requires that the taxpayer provide intentionally inaccurate or incomplete information to the tax 
authorities to reduce the tax burden. Most countries thus apply criminal penalties only to taxpayers who 
knew (or were frivolously ignorant) of their non-compliance or acted in gross negligence. However, in 
recent years, the tax authorities seem to have been trying to shift this classical line between avoidance and 
evasion (Friese et al. 2008). As mentioned above, Greece announced to declare certain actions illegal and 
many countries have introduced civil penalties for risky avoidance, thus creating a new illegal status that is 
not in line with the classical distinction (Friese et al. 2008). Further, in a non-tax context, certain actions 
such as smoking in buildings might be legal or illegal, depending on the country, state, or jurisdiction. 
Hence, it is not unusual for policy makers to exercise their discretion when labeling actions as either legal 
or illegal. Thus, if audits are too costly and therefore detection risk is very low, this approach could be an 
effective policy option. However, regarding the application to tax policy, we also identify several 
limitations. Tax minimization is usually subject to the risk of negative financial consequences. In such a 
setting, the legality effect could be overlaid by a stronger penalty effect and thus tax minimization behavior 
is only affected by legality if subjects have high tax morale (as in our third experiment, induced by moral 
priming). Such high tax morale, however, cannot be generally assumed, as our second experiment 
demonstrates. Moreover, our results suggest that the legality effect differs between countries due to the 
cross-country variation in tax morale (Alm and Torgler 2006). Thus, clearly defining some tax shelters as 
illegal could work in high-tax morale countries but does not seem to be a promising policy option in 
countries with low or moderate tax morale. 
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2. Experiment 1: Baseline Setting 
2.1 Method, Data, and Procedure 
In the baseline experiment, we use two different presentations of a tax minimization opportunity to examine 
the effect of legality in accordance with Kirchler et al. (2003). We use a between-subjects setting. In the 
Legal Tax Avoidance group, a licit tax avoidance opportunity with the wording legal tax loophole is 
available to the participants. We change the wording for the group Illegal Tax Evasion to illegal tax evasion. 
All else is equal between these two groups. 
The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007) and 
performed in the XXX laboratory of the XXX University in January 2014. The 64 participants were 
graduate students (27%) and undergraduate students (73%) from different departments of the XXX 
University; 59% of the participants were male and the average age was 25.36 years (SD 9.12). All 
participants were recruited by email. 
We randomly assigned the treatments to computer workstations before the arrival of the participants. The 
computer workstations were equipped with screen walls to prevent communication and visual contact 
between the participants. After arrival, we randomly assigned the participants to a computer workstation 
by using an identification number (double-blind trial to avoid an experimenter effect). After each participant 
was seated at their workstation, general information was loudly spoken. General information included basic 
information about the workstation’s utilities (a computer, printer instructions, a pen, a calculator, and a 
stack of sheets), the experimental procedure, the rules (no talking, no leaving the room while the experiment 
is running), and a request to ask questions if something remained unclear (asking and answering in private). 
Then, the experiment was started. After completing the experiment and the questionnaire, the participants 
were remunerated in cash. The participants received on average €19.44. The average duration was around 
two hours but there was no time limit. 
To increase the external validity of the experiment and to rule out house money effects (Thaler and Johnson 
1990), participants earned income by conducting a real effort task. The real effort task was a simple data 
input task. Paper test sheets from a modified multiple-choice test had to be keyed into the computer. The 
gross wage was 10 ECU (1 ECU = €0.07) per correctly recorded sheet. There was a limited number of 
possible box ticking schemes. Therefore, we were able to control for correct and incorrect keyed sheets. 
After passing a trial round, the participant contracted on his/her labor supply (number of sheets to digitize, 
between zero and 48 sheets). This contract approach decouples the labor supply decision as well as the tax 
avoidance decision from small imperfections in the lab that can never be fully prohibited. For example, we 
avoid herding issues that may distort labor supply in experiments where subjects are free to decide on their 
7 
working time. Moreover, this contract approach maps service contracts and the work of many freelancers. 
The participants had to fulfill this contract to earn the wage. In other words, the subjects agreed on a contract 
with a self-determined amount of labor supply. They only received the full remuneration after correctly 
typing in the contracted amount of sheets. Additional sheets typed in were not remunerated. To decrease 
time uncertainty, the computer displayed the processing time for the trial round. 
The earned income was subject to taxation. We set up a salient progressive tax scheme. The first four sheets 
were tax exempt, the fifth (and above) sheet was taxed at 30%, and the 29th sheet (and above) was taxed at 
65%. We chose the progressive tax scheme for three reasons: First, the sharp kinks in the marginal tax rate 
together with the very transparent presentation of the tax burden are supposed to “hurt” the participants 
financially to make the tax burden more salient. At the second kink, the net wage is reduced by half (35% 
above the kink instead of 70% below the kink). Second, progressive income tax systems are implemented 
in most countries (though with different rates). Third, the kinks offer an easy way to test whether the 
treatments also affect labor supply, which is not the case (see footnote 5). 
The tax was earmarked; that is, the tax revenues remained in the budget of the XXX Business School.5 
Since we aim to measure the effect of tax minimization legality, we had to use loaded tax instructions 
instead of neutral instructions. Although this method generally bears the risk of subjects using individual 
scripts when interpreting loaded terms (Alm 2010), it increases external validity (Abbink and Henning-
Schmidt 2006). 
We offered a tax reduction opportunity with the wording legal tax loophole or illegal tax evasion and asked 
the participants about the number of sheets between zero and six they did not want to declare as taxable 
income. We arbitrarily set the number of six sheets in our experiment. This reflects limits in real-life legal 
and illegal tax minimization. For example, a cash business might be able to hide some of its revenues but 
certainly not all of them. Only a part of them can be hidden, since it would be too suspicious if zero revenues 
were reported. Tax minimization (legal tax avoidance or illegal tax evasion) would not be challenged or 
detected and consequently would not be penalized. Besides stating in the instructions that potential tax 
evasion would not be uncovered, we increased the salience of missing penalties by providing subjects with 
full information regarding the financial consequences of their decision (see Figure 1). In other words, we 
                                                 
5  We used an earmarked tax to be salient about the use of the tax payments from the experiments. This prevents 
subjects from using different mental scripts regarding the potential use of their payments and therefore increases 
our control over their preferences. We are aware that the use of tax revenues could, in general, matter for tax 
compliance (e.g., Dörrenberg 2015). However, we use a between-subject design. Thus, we think that the results 
presented are unaffected by our choice to earmark experimental tax revenues as long as we assume that our 
treatment effect (legality) does not interact with tax revenue use. 
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manipulated the legal qualification of tax minimization but implemented identical monetary consequences 
for the participants. 
The participants chose their labor effort and the amount of tax minimization (tax base reduction) by 
positioning sliders on a screen (see Figure 1). Participants had to decide simultaneously on their labor effort 
and tax minimization. To prevent experimenter effects, we ensured that the experimenter did not observe 
participants’ actual avoidance or evasion decisions during the experiment. Since tax avoidance depends on 
tax awareness (Alstadsæter and Jacob 2013) and since we did not want to analyze different levels of tax 
awareness, we communicated the tax burden in a very salient way: We displayed the gross wage (in ECU), 
the tax burden (in percent) and the net wage (in ECU) for an additional sheet for current labor effort and 
tax minimization, that is, depending on the sliders’ positions a participant chose. The sliders’ positions 
could be changed until the participant confirmed his/her choices by pressing the Next button. The 
participant then had to confirm the decision a second time to enter the labor contract. We present a 
translation of the instructions in Appendix II. Figure 1 includes a translated screenshot from the 
experimental program for the treatment Legal Tax Avoidance to illustrate the decision process. 
Figure 1: Example of the decision situation for the treatment Legal 
Tax Avoidance with no negative detection consequences
 
In this example, the participant chose 30 sheets to digitize. Additionally, he/she chose to legally reduce 
his/her taxable income by two sheets. Thus, 28 sheets are taxable. Using the legal tax loophole, the 
participant effectively avoided the high tax bracket, with a marginal income tax of 65% for the last two 
sheets. 
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After the participant confirmed the individual labor effort and level of tax reduction, he/she was asked to 
fill out the first part of a post-experimental questionnaire that included questions regarding morale and tax 
system fairness (see Appendix V). After the participant fulfilled the labor task, the second part of the 
questionnaire was presented. The second part included control questions and sociodemographic questions 
concerning, for example, gender, age, net income, and university courses (see Appendix V). 
2.2 Empirical Results and Discussion 
Figure 2 compares the average tax base reduction (measured in sheets, between zero and six) between the 
treatments Legal Tax Avoidance and Illegal Tax Evasion. The reduction in the tax base is our measure of 
tax minimization. 
Figure 2: Comparison of Legal Tax Avoidance and Illegal Tax Evasion in Experiment 1 
Subjects had to key in paper test sheets from a modified multiple-choice test. Earned income was subject to taxes but 
the subjects could choose between zero and six sheets they did not want to declare as taxable income by exploiting a 
tax avoidance/evasion opportunity. 
  
In the evasion treatment, the tax base reduction is, on average, 2.84 sheets lower compared to the avoidance 
treatment. The difference is statistically significant (p < 0.01, N = 64).6 This finding is in line with our 
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theoretical prediction. In the absence of negative detection consequences, the legal presentation of tax 
minimization opportunities matters. Recall that the monetary consequences are the same for both 
treatments. This difference is due to higher moral costs, as we show in our theoretical model in Appendix I. 
Importantly, the effect we observe is economically significant: Labeling a tax minimization opportunity as 
illegal versus legal reduces tax base reduction by 53.18% (= 2.84/5.34). 
To control for different sociodemographic variables and subjects’ tax minimization incentives, we use OLS 
and Tobit regressions. As described above, we use a tax system with three brackets to increase tax rate 
salience. Since one unit of tax base reduction leads to relatively high tax savings when the taxpayer is in 
the highest bracket compared to the other brackets, we control for subjects’ tax minimization incentives by 
including MTR as a control variable. The variable MTR is defined as the participants’ counterfactual 
marginal tax rate before tax minimization. We also control for gender. In untabulated results, we included 
other demographic variables, such as age, net income, and education, because they have at least some effect 
on tax compliance in other studies (Pickhardt and Prinz 2014). In our sample, however, only gender affects 
tax minimization behavior. The result that women act less tax aggressively is in line with most previous 
research (e.g. Kastlunger et al. 2010, Torgler and Valev 2010). The other demographic variables are 
insignificant and do not affect the results regarding the treatment effects. Thus, we only include a gender 
dummy variable in the results.7 
Panel A of Table 1 presents the results from an OLS regression. We present the results for all three 
experiments in Table 1. Column 1 contains the results from the first experiment. The tax base reduction is, 
on average, 2.73 sheets lower when the tax minimization opportunity is labeled illegal tax evasion 
compared to legal tax loophole (variable Evasion). This difference is significant at the 1% level and 
supports our univariate finding. Again, the economic magnitude is large: The coefficient estimate suggests 
that declaring tax minimization as illegal reduces tax base reduction by 50.98% of the sample mean. Since 
the effect in the multivariate regression is very close to our non-parametric result, none of our additional 
control variables appears to bias the effect of interest. 
In addition, we find the marginal tax rate has a strong effect. The tax base reduction is, on average, 1.259 
(= 3.598(0.65 – 0.3)) sheets higher when a participant is in the higher tax bracket compared to a participant 
in the lower tax bracket (p-value < 0.05). Male participants avoid or evade, on average, 1.269 sheets more 
                                                 
7  Moreover, work effort is not significantly associated with legality. For example, a non-parametric Mann-Whitney 
U test for differences in the work effort between the treatments Legal Tax Avoidance and Illegal Tax Evasion does 
not show significant differences (p = 0.4621). We obtain similar insignificant results in all three experiments when 
we regress the number of digitalized sheets on Evasion and the control variables. 
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than female participants do (p-value < 0.05).8 To address concerns that using OLS in the presence of a 
truncated dependent variable biases our results, Panel B of Table 1 shows the Tobit regression results for 
all three experiments. Again, column 1 contains the results for our first experiment. The results are 
qualitatively similar to those in the OLS setting. Most importantly, the marginal effects in the Tobit model 
are close to the OLS marginal effects. For example, we observe a marginal effect of Evasion on the 
unconditional expected value of Tax Base Reduction of -2.368 for the first experiment.9 This is very close 
to the OLS estimate of -2.732. Further, we again find significant coefficients for Male and MTR. Taken 
together, we find a strong legality effect in our first experiment. Thus, in line with the expressive law 
approach, subjects’ moral costs and thus their behavior could be influenced by defining the borderline 
between legal and illegal activities, even in the absence of any enforcement. 
However, one could be concerned about the external validity of our setting, since we assume there is no 
detection or penalty risk. Outside the lab, tax evasion is under penalty of law. Tax avoidance also bears the 
risk of non-acceptance by the tax authority due to tax law ambiguity. In this case, the risk of back taxes and 
interest charges reflects uncertainty about the correct tax treatment due to difficulties in interpreting the 
existing ambiguous tax laws. This is typical for real-world tax avoidance. For example, firms are required 
to disclose these uncertain tax positions in their financial statements in accordance with US GAAP FIN 48. 
In addition, this approach is in line with recent empirical and theoretical research examining tax avoidance 
in an environment in which taxpayers are uncertain regarding their tax liability (e.g., Alm 1988b, Beck and 
Jung 1989a, 1989b, Beck et al. 1992, 1996, 2000, Mills et al. 2010, De Simone et al. 2013, Dyreng et al. 
2014). The risk of detection/non-acceptance and negative consequences (penalties in the case of evasion 
and interest charges in the case of avoidance) could influence and actually mute the observed legality effect. 
To analyze whether the legality effect holds for tax minimization with audit risk and penalization, we 
conduct a second experiment. We introduce audit risk and potential negative detection consequences. Audit 
risk and the financial consequences of detection are equal for legal and illegal tax minimization; the only 
difference is the wording. Again, we compare legal and illegal tax minimization between subjects. 
                                                 
8  In untabulated results, we analyze potential interaction effects between Evasion and MTR or Male. We do not 
observe interaction effects between Evasion and the other two independent variables. 
9  Since a direct economic interpretation of Tobit coefficients is not possible, we use the user-written Stata command 
dtobit2 to calculate the marginal effects.  
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3. Experiment 2: Uncertainty 
3.1 Method, Data, and Procedure 
The experiment was again programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007) and 
performed in the XXX laboratory of the XXX University in June 2014. The 65 participants were graduate 
students (23%) and undergraduate students (77%) from different departments of the XXX University; 60% 
of the participants were male and the average age was 22.42 years (SD 3.62). All the participants were 
recruited by email to prevent subjects’ repeated participation. 
We change the baseline experiment with respect to detection consequences. In the first experiment, no tax 
minimization is detected; the tax savings are certain. Thus, only moral costs but no financial costs can occur. 
In our second experiment, we introduce negative detection consequences as a lottery, all else being equal. 
In the Legal Tax Avoidance treatment, the detection is called denial (versus acceptance) and the negative 
financial consequences are called tax payments plus interest. In the Illegal Tax Evasion treatment, we use 
the terms detection and tax payments plus penalty. The detection probability (25%) and negative financial 
consequences (1.5 times the avoided or evaded tax) are equal in the legal avoidance and illegal evasion 
treatments. We thereby ensure that the decision problems of legal tax avoidance and illegal tax evasion are 
still financially identical. During the experiment, the experimenter did not observe participants’ actual 
avoidance or evasion decisions. 
Similar to our first experiment, we maximize salience by providing subjects with full information on the 
financial consequences of their decisions (see Figure 3). In this example, the participant again chose 30 
sheets to digitize. Additionally, he/she chose to legally reduce his/her taxable income by two sheets. We 
display the financial consequences for an additional digitized sheet given current labor effort and tax 
minimization choices. In addition, we present the consequences for the two possible stages (detection vs. 
no detection). Our design thus ensures a salient presentation of all possible financial consequences of 
subject’s choices. We present a translation of the experimental instructions in Appendix III. 
To summarize, there are two key differences between the second and first experiments. First, there are 
potential negative financial consequences. This leads to a second cost component in addition to moral cost 
of tax minimization. Second, the detection consequences are now uncertain. Thus, risk taking behavior 
should also influence the tax minimization behavior. 
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Figure 3: Example of the decision situation for the treatment Legal 
Tax Avoidance with negative detection consequences 
 
. 
3.2 Empirical Results and Discussion 
Figure 4 displays the average tax base reduction (in sheets) for our two legality treatments, Legal Tax 
Avoidance and Illegal Tax Evasion, for participants with uncertain negative detection consequences. On 
average, the tax base reduction amounts to 3.44 sheets (3.45 sheets) when the tax minimization is declared 
as legal avoidance (illegal evasion). It thus appears that legality does not matter in the presence of detection 
risk and uncertainty, since the difference is statistically and economically insignificant. In other words, we 
observe a strong moderating effect of detection consequences with respect to legality. The results of the 
multivariate OLS and Tobit regressions confirm this finding (Table 1, column 2).10 As in the first 
experiment, we control for the counterfactual marginal tax rate before tax minimization and for gender. 
Additionally, we control for participants’ risk attitude (variable Risk). We use the answers from one of our 
                                                 
10  Again, we find that the Tobit marginal effects on the unconditional expected value of the tax minimization behavior 
are close to the OLS marginal effects. For instance, we observe an insignificant marginal effect of Evasion on the 
unconditional expected value of Tax Base Reduction amounting to -0.186 (OLS -0.286) for the second experiment. 
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post-experimental questions to measure the risk attitude from zero (no risk taking at all) to 10 (high risk 
taking behavior).11 Our treatment variable Evasion fails to explain the tax minimization behavior. 
Moreover, we find no significant effects of MTR or Male. Only risk attitude explains the observed tax 
minimization behavior (p-value < 0.01). 
Figure 4: Comparison of Legal Tax Avoidance and Illegal Tax Evasion in Experiment 2 
Subjects had to key in paper test sheets from a modified multiple-choice test. Earned income was subject 
to taxes but subjects could choose between zero and six sheets they did not want to declare as taxable 
income by exploiting a tax avoidance/evasion opportunity. 
  
This result is consistent with our model in the Appendix I. However, there are four potential explanations 
for this result and our model only explains the result with the fourth explanation, namely, crowding out. 
First, participants in the evasion treatment could decide to use only a small fraction of the maximum income 
concealment (e.g., two or three sheets out of six). This behavior would allow participants to realize a 
financial advantage while maintaining their positive self-concept (Mazar et al. 2008). It is possible that a 
relatively small fine would not change their behavior. Second, by introducing the risk that the revenue 
agency will not accept the tax avoidance strategy, the line between legality and illegality can be blurred and 
                                                 
11  The wording for the question is taken from the SOEP and is experimentally validated by Dohmen et al. (2011). 
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thus the difference in subjects’ moral evaluations could disappear. Third, the penalty setting comes with a 
higher cognitive load. The introduction of risky penalties increases the participants’ cognitive load. Dohmen 
et al. (2010) argue that decisions under risk are complex, so that cognitive ability influences risk aversion. 
Under the additional cognitive load of a risky penalty, the participants may neglect tax morale issues. 
Previous research has shown that a high cognitive load reduces the effectiveness of injunctive norms 
(Kredentser et al. 2012). 
Fourth and presumably most importantly, external interventions can undermine intrinsic motivation (Deci 
and Ryan 1985, Gneezy and Rustichini 2000a, 2000b, Fehr and Falk 2002, Gneezy et al. 2011). In case of 
tax evasion, the financial risk could crowd out intrinsic compliance in the treatment where subjects have an 
evasion opportunity (Scholz and Lubell 1998, Feld and Frey 2007, Boyer et al. 2014, Dwenger et al. 2015).12 
Thus, the effect of financial penalties on legal and illegal tax minimization behavior could differ (for formal 
derivations, see Appendix I): Negative detection consequences reduce the financial returns of both 
alternatives but, in the illegal setting, they could additionally crowd out intrinsic tax morale. The 
introduction of detection risk and penalties could also be interpreted as the introduction of monitoring. 
Participants know that their compliance behavior is now observable (monitored) or at least they know that 
it is possible that their compliance behavior will be observed due to auditing. Introducing monitoring could 
lead to side effects. In particular, monitoring could crowd out intrinsic motivation when monitoring is 
interpreted as a signal of distrust (Falk and Kosfeld 2006). This could also affect unmonitored dimensions 
(Belot and Schröder 2015). Thus, the introduction of monitoring itself could crowd out intrinsic motivation 
to comply. Again, the effect of penalties on legal and illegal tax minimization behavior could differ because 
the crowding out of intrinsic tax morale is more important in the illegal tax evasion treatment (see Appendix 
I). 
Importantly, we can rule out the first two explanations with our data and with an additional survey. The 
third explanation can be ruled out with the third experiment below. The first explanation (maintaining a 
positive self-concept) is not very likely. The vast majority of our participants in the first experiment evaded 
either nothing or they evaded the full amount of six sheets (see Figure 5). When we introduced penalties 
and detection risk, we still find that over 75% of the participants evaded either nothing or all six sheets. We 
interpret the findings in Figure 5 as evidence against the explanation that individuals try to maintain their 
self-concept by evading only small amounts. 
                                                 
12  Whereas Dwenger et al. (2015) do not observe that deterrence crowds out intrinsic motivation to pay a voluntary 
church tax, Boyer et al. (2014), in a similar setting, find a crowding out of intrinsic motivation in a group of weakly 
intrinsically motivated individuals. No crowding out was observed for subjects with high tax morale. Thus, 
crowding out seems to depend on the strength of the intrinsic motivation.  
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Figure 5: Tax base reduction (sheets) in the evasion treatments in Experiments 1 and 2 
 
It is also unlikely that the second explanation (the blurred line between evasion and avoidance) drives our 
results. We conducted an additional online survey (see Appendix VI for a translation of the survey 
questions) to directly test this explanation. We asked 328 students (average age 22.66 years, 60% male) 
from different faculties of the XXX University regarding their moral evaluation of tax minimization in four 
between-subject settings. In particular, we randomly assigned subjects to one of four tax settings where a 
described tax minimization activity is (i) legal and risky, (ii) legal and certain, (iii) illegal and risky, or 
(iv) illegal and certain. Participants were asked whether the tax minimization activity described could be 
justified or not (on a scale of one, never justified, to 10, always justified). Table 2 displays the results. The 
main finding is that the difference between illegal and legal tax minimization is not much affected by the 
introduction of risk. Without risk, the difference in moral evaluation between legal and illegal tax 
minimization amounts to 4.3 and it decreases only slightly to 4.1 in the risky setting. The effect of legality 
is strongly significant in both settings (p < 0.001, Mann-Whitney U). Thus, we conclude that the results 
observed in the second experiment cannot be explained by a blurred line between legal and illegal behavior. 
To directly test the crowding out explanation for the treatment Illegal Tax Evasion, we regress Illegal Tax 
Base Reduction on Tax Morale, controlling for MTR and Gender, and present the findings in Table 3. In 
line with previous research (e.g., Alm and Torgler 2006, Dörrenberg and Peichl 2013), we use the post-
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proxy of tax morale.13 The new variable Tax Morale is a binary variable and equals one if participants’ self-
reported attitude on “cheating on taxes if you have the chance” (on a scale of one, never justified, to 10, 
always justified) is less than three (median split). The results presented in Panel A of Table 3 (OLS) and 
Panel B (Tobit) are in line with this explanation, since they indicate that tax morale reduces tax evasion in 
the first experiments but not in the second (significant coefficient of Tax Morale in Panel A, column 1, -
1.773, versus the insignificant coefficient in column 2).14 Moreover, in line with the above reasoning, the 
findings presented in Table 4 demonstrate that mean tax avoidance decreases significantly from the first 
experiment to the second (p > 0.001, Mann-Whitney U), whereas we observe no significant difference 
regarding mean tax evasion between the first and second experiments ( p = 0.139, Mann-Whitney U). In 
addition, we find that the percentage of highly intrinsically motivated subjects, that is, subjects who do not 
evade taxes at all, decreases from 46.9% (first experiment) to 27.3% (second experiment). However, this 
difference is only significant if we use a one-sided test (p = 0.051, Pearson’s chi-squared test) and therefore 
must be interpreted with caution. Still, these results are indicative that crowding out potentially explains 
the results of the second experiment. 
Finally, to rule out the cognitive load explanation and to address the crowding out explanation, we conduct 
a third experiment. In this experiment, we use the same penalty setting as in the second experiment; in other 
words, we hold the cognitive load of the environment constant. The only difference is that we now prime 
the participants prior to the actual experiment during the instruction period. Moral priming (affective 
priming) is a technique to temporarily promote empathy in laboratory experiments. It can but does not have 
to be directly related to the topic in question (e.g., taxes). By giving the participants a simple task pertaining 
to a moral question, we try to temporarily increase their morality. Based on the theoretical model in 
Appendix I, this should reduce crowding out and reinforce the legality effect. 
4. Experiment 3: Moral Priming 
4.1 Method, Data, and Procedure 
The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007) and 
performed in the XXX laboratory of the XXX University in June 2014. The 62 participants were graduate 
students (26%) and undergraduate students (74%) from different departments of the XXX University; 48% 
of the participants were male and the average age was 22.02 years (SD 3.22). All the participants were 
recruited by email. Hence, we were again able to prevent subjects’ repeated participation. 
                                                 
13  Question v234 from the 2008 European Values Study. 
14  This also holds for coefficients from Tobit estimations in Panel B of Table 3.   
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We base our third experiment on the setting of the second experiment with uncertain detection 
consequences and extend the setting by introducing the moral priming of all participants. We rely on the 
affective priming introduced to tax research by Christian and Alm (2014), which has already been proven 
effective. In contrast to these authors, we concentrate on individual tax reporting decisions and do not 
consider group interactions. 
Immediately before the participants set their simultaneous labor supply and tax base reduction, they had to 
solve a moral priming task. For the moral priming, following Christian and Alm (2014), we used six 
different versions of the Golden Rule and asked the participants to summarize the common ground in their 
own words by using a special sheet of paper. At the end of the experiment, the participants had to hand out 
the sheet to the experimenter. As financial remuneration for the additional time, the participants received 
€5 for the priming part of the experiment. We present a translation of the instructions in Appendix IV. 
4.2 Empirical Results and Discussion 
Figure 6 shows the mean tax base reduction (in sheets) for the two legality treatments Legal Tax Avoidance 
and Illegal Tax Evasion for the participants with uncertain negative detection consequences and moral 
priming. On average, the tax base reduction amounts to 4.06 sheets (2.81 sheets) when the tax minimization 
is denoted legal avoidance (illegal evasion). The difference is statistically significant (p-value < 0.05). It 
thus appears as if legality matters when uncertain negative detection consequences and a moral priming 
task are set. The economic effect is not as strong as in our first experiment, but it is still economically 
significant. Labeling a tax minimization opportunity as illegal versus legal reduces tax base reduction, on 
average, by 1.25 sheets. This is equivalent to a decrease of 30.79%, compared to 53.18% in the first 
experiment. Still, the effect is economically significant. This result is also in line with our model in 
Appendix I. 
In column 3 of Panel A in Table 1, we present the corresponding OLS results. As in our second experiment, 
we control for the counterfactual marginal tax rate before tax minimization and participants’ risk attitude 
and gender. We find a significant lower tax base reduction when the tax minimization opportunity is labeled 
as illegal (on average, 0.945 sheets lower, p-value = 0.075). In the sample mean, declaring tax minimization 
as illegal reduces tax base reduction by 24.19%. As in Experiment 2, we do not find significant effects of 
MTR or Male. The risk attitude strongly explains the observed tax minimization behavior (p-value < 0.01). 
The Tobit regression in column 3 of Panel B in Table 1 yields a similar result.15 
                                                 
15  For instance, we observe a marginal effect of Evasion on the unconditional expected value of Tax Base Reduction 
amounting to -0.892 (OLS -0.945) for the third experiment. 
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Figure 6: Comparison of Legal Tax Avoidance and Illegal Tax Evasion in Experiment 3 
Subjects had to key in paper test sheets from a modified multiple-choice test. Earned income was subject 
to taxes but the subjects could choose between zero and six sheets they did not want to declare as taxable 
income by exploiting a tax avoidance/evasion opportunity. 
  
To directly test whether moral priming increases the moral costs of tax evasion, we regress Illegal Tax Base 
Reduction on Tax Morale, MTR, and Gender. The results in Table 3 show that subjects’ tax morale does 
not affect tax evasion behavior in Experiment 2 (insignificant coefficient for Tax Morale in Panel A, column 
2). In contrast, tax morale affects evasion in Experiment 3: The coefficient of Tax Morale in Panel A, 
column 3, is significant and amounts to -2.171.16 Since the cognitive load is the same in both experiments, 
we conclude that the difference must be due to the higher morale cost in Experiment 3 that is induced by 
priming. Thus, even in high-cognitive load settings, intrinsic preferences for obeying the law matter. 
Additionally, we test whether our priming is effective by directly comparing the results of the second 
experiment with those of the third. We present our p-values from testing whether the difference in tax 
minimization between experiments is statistically different from zero in the last row of Table 4. Priming 
does not significantly reduce mean evasion (p = 0.277, Mann-Whitney U) but it significantly reduces the 
percentage of full tax evaders (p = 0.061, Pearson’s chi-squared test). As expected, priming does not affect 
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tax avoidance. Taken together, legality affects an individual’s tax minimization decisions. However, when 
the risk of detection and penalties is introduced, the legality effect is overlaid by a stronger penalty effect. 
The legality effect is reestablished under moral priming. In terms of economic magnitude, we do not find 
the legality effect to be as strong as in our first experiment. However, the economic magnitude of the effect 
remains significant, since legality reduces tax minimization by 30%. This result is consistent with moral 
priming increasing the moral costs of tax evasion, which in turn seems to mitigate the crowding out effect 
of penalties. Stated simply, moral priming increases the salience of legality as the expressive function of 
law. 
5. Robustness Checks 
We next subject our analysis to a set of robustness tests. The first concern relates to our dependent variable, 
that is, the number of sheets that the participants did not declare as taxable income. There may be concerns 
that, due to the progressive tax rate, one avoided or evaded sheet may be associated with different amounts 
of actual tax reduction. To address the concern that the actual tax savings matter, we use the tax reduction 
in euros as an alternative dependent variable. Table 5 shows the results from OLS regression. The results 
are qualitatively similar. Using the coefficient estimate for our first experiment, we find that declaring tax 
minimization as illegal reduces the amount of tax reduction, on average, by 54.6%. This economic 
magnitude is very similar to our baseline estimate. Importantly, we observe exactly the same pattern of 
effects as before. When risk is introduced, the legality effect disappears but is reestablished once there is 
moral priming. Again, the economic magnitude of the effect decreases from the first to the third experiment 
but remains economically significant. 
The second analysis relates to the selection of subjects. In our analysis, we use data from all the participants 
who completed the experiments. However, it is not clear that all the participants correctly understood the 
actual tax burden. In our experimental setup, we maximize the salience of the tax code but concerns could 
remain. Hence, as an additional robustness check, we restricted the sample to those participants who 
correctly answered a manipulation check on the tax rate. This was a question about the actual marginal tax 
rate. To be more precise, we asked the participants to indicate their marginal tax rate depending on their 
real effort and tax minimization without considering any negative detection consequences. In this 
robustness test, we include only participants who indicated the correct marginal tax rates.17 The OLS 
regression results are presented in Panel A of Table 6 (with tax base reduction as the dependent variable) 
                                                 
17  We also include participants who quoted 35% (60%) as the marginal tax rate; 30% (65%) was the correct answer. 
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and Panel B (with actual tax reduction as the dependent variable). Again, the results are qualitatively 
similar.18 We find a significant effect of legality in the first experiment (column 1). As before, the legality 
effect disappears when we introduce detection and penalty risk (second experiment, column 2) but the effect 
is reestablished when there is moral priming. 
6. Conclusion 
The law not only sets prices for behavior (penalties, imperative function) but also expresses social values 
(expressive function). Therefore, it could influence individual behavior independent of enforcement and 
penalties. In this expressive law approach, legality could act as a reference point for individuals in 
rationalizing their decisions. We apply this approach to tax minimization that can be either legal (tax 
avoidance) or illegal (tax evasion). 
Using three real effort laboratory experiments, we examine how legality affects tax minimization behavior. 
Our experiments confirm the assumption that legislators can affect individual moral evaluations by defining 
the borderline between legality and illegality. However, the experiments also reveal important limitations 
of the expressive law approach not previously discussed in the literature. 
Without detection and penalty risk, we find that the qualification of a tax minimization opportunity as illegal 
evasion as opposed to legal avoidance significantly reduces tax minimization. In line with the expressive 
law approach, legality appears to be an important determinant of tax minimization behavior. However, once 
we include detection and penalty risk, we no longer observe legality affecting tax minimization. Since we 
demonstrate in an additional survey that the difference in moral evaluation between legal and illegal tax 
minimization remains almost unaffected by the introduction of negative financial consequences, we can 
rule out that blurring the line between legal and illegal behavior is the reason the legality effect vanishes. 
Instead, our finding is consistent with the crowding out effect of penalties on the intrinsic motivation to 
comply. To test whether the legality effect can be reestablished in an environment with risky penalties (and 
to rule out cognitive load as a potential explanation), we conduct a third experiment where we add moral 
priming to the second experiment. Our findings indicate that moral priming reestablishes the legality effect, 
which implies that there is a crowding out effect of penalties in the case of tax evasion. 
Our paper contributes to the small but growing body of research that stresses the differences between 
avoidance and evasion (e.g. Alm 1988a, Kirchler et al. 2003, Neck et al. 2012). We add to this literature by 
demonstrating that individual behavior may differ significantly between legal and illegal tax minimization, 
                                                 
18  This also holds for the coefficients from Tobit estimations (untabulated). 
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which should be considered in future work. In particular, experimental research should take this legality 
effect into account. When designing experiments on tax compliance, the wording (tax avoidance vs. tax 
evasion) could have substantial effects on participant behavior and lead to surprising findings. Beyond tax 
research, we contribute to the body of research dealing with authority in economic decision making. For 
example, Silverman et al. (2014) show in different public good games that the subject’s contribution 
depends on the interaction of expert explanations and penalties. In line with our findings, enforcement of 
the law does not depend solely on penalties but also on legality. 
While our findings are subject to the typical external validity concerns of experiments, we can cautiously 
draw some conclusions for tax policy. One possible policy implication of our result is that moving the 
borderline between legality and illegality could affect aggressive tax avoidance only if the taxpayers in the 
country in question have high tax morale (as induced by moral priming in the third experiment). In this 
vein, it could well be that the recent approach of the Greek government to broaden the definition of tax 
evasion is not a promising policy tool to increase tax revenues if tax morale remains at its currently low 
level.19 Besides their direct importance in tax policy and research, our results should be of interest in other 
areas in which legislators or organizations are trying to achieve compliance.   
                                                 
19  Based on banks’ perceptions of true income, Artavanis et al. (2012) estimate that unreported annual income for 
Greece exceeds €28 billion. 
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Table 1: Regression analysis 
This table presents the regression results from OLS estimations (Panel A) and Tobit estimations (Panel B). The three 
columns represent the results from our three different experiments. Experiment 1 is our baseline experiment, with no 
negative detection consequences and no moral priming. Experiment 2 includes negative detection consequences and 
Experiment 3 includes negative detection consequences and moral priming. The dependent variable, Tax Base 
Reduction, is measured in sheets. Subjects had to key in paper test sheets from a modified multiple-choice test. Earned 
income was subject to taxes but the subjects could choose between zero and six sheets they did not want to declare as 
taxable income by exploiting a tax avoidance/evasion opportunity. The variable Evasion equals one if the tax 
minimization opportunity is labeled as illegal tax evasion, MTR is the marginal income tax rate before tax 
minimization, Male equals one if the participant is male, and Risk is participants’ self-reported risk taking behavior 
(SOEP question, on a scale from zero, no risk taking, to 10, very high risk taking). We report standard errors in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: OLS estimation 








Evasion -2.732*** -0.286 -0.945* 
 (0.525) (0.524) (0.521) 
MTR 3.598** 1.913 0.221 
 (1.512) (1.476) (1.459) 
Male 1.269** 0.206 0.116 
 (0.540) (0.563) (0.521) 
Risk  0.476*** 0.348*** 
  (0.115) (0.0977) 
Constant 3.000*** 0.135 2.058** 
 (0.778) (0.862) (0.952) 
Observations 64 65 62 
Adj. R-squared 0.398 0.254 0.206 
 
Panel B: Tobit estimation 








Evasion -15.16*** -0.464 -1.729* 
 (4.938) (1.235) (0.945) 
MTR 20.51* 3.490 0.712 
 (10.39) (3.477) (2.626) 
Male 7.128* -0.0628 0.0592 
 (3.615) (1.339) (0.950) 
Risk  1.241*** 0.664*** 
  (0.324) (0.193) 
Constant 3.853 -3.335 1.038 
 (4.238) (2.190) (1.743) 
Observations 64 65 62 
Pseudo R-squared 0.212 0.106 0.077 
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Table 2: Moral evaluation of tax minimization (survey results) 
This table presents the survey results regarding the moral evaluation of tax minimization in four between-subject 
settings. The participants are asked whether the described tax minimization activity could be justified or not (on a 
scale of 1, never justified, to 10, always justified). Thus, higher values imply that the respective activity is more 
justifiable. The described tax minimization activity varies with respect to the legality (legal tax avoidance versus 
illegal tax evasion) and risk (risky versus certain tax minimization). 
 Tax Minimization
 Legal/Risky Legal/Certain Illegal/Risky Illegal/Certain
Dependent Variable Moral Evaluation Moral Evaluation Moral Evaluation Moral Evaluation
Mean 7.24 7.94 3.14 3.61
SD 2.33 2.49 2.35 2.62
Median 8.00 9.00 3.00 3.00
Observations 87 88 74 79 
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Table 3: Multivariate analysis for illegal tax evasion treatments including tax morale 
This table presents the regression results from OLS estimations (Panel A) and Tobit estimations (Panel B). The three 
columns represent the results of our three different experiments including solely the illegal tax evasion treatment. 
Experiment 1 is our baseline experiment, with no negative detection consequences and no moral priming. Experiment 
2 includes negative detection consequences and Experiment 3 includes negative detection consequences and moral 
priming. The dependent variable, Illegal Tax Base Reduction, is measured in sheets; Tax morale is a binary variable 
and equals one if participants’ self-reported attitude on “cheating on taxes if you have the chance” (2008 European 
Values Study question v234, on a scale from one, never justified, to 10, always justified) is less than three (median 
split); MTR is the marginal income tax rate before tax minimization; and Male equals one if the participant is male. 
We report standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
Panel A: OLS estimation 
Experiment 1 2 3 
Dependent Variable Illegal Tax Base 
Reduction
Illegal Tax Base 
Reduction
Illegal Tax Base 
Reduction 
Tax Morale -1.773* 0.0802 -2.171** 
 (0.935) (1.068) (0.845) 
MTR 3.455 3.937 -0.651 
 (2.552) (2.908) (2.381) 
Male 1.098 0.0394 0.148 
 (0.936) (1.032) (0.837) 
Constant 1.263 1.391 3.880*** 
  (1.422) (1.557) (1.263) 
Observations 32 33 31 
Adj. R-squared 0.217 0.000 0.108 
 
Panel B: Tobit estimation 
Experiment 1 2 3 
Dependent Variable Illegal Tax Base 
Reduction
Illegal Tax Base 
Reduction
Illegal Tax Base 
Reduction 
Tax Morale -10.03* 0.851 -4.988** 
 (5.553) (4.222) (2.033) 
MTR 11.19 13.68 -1.235 
 (12.21) (11.59) (5.160) 
Male 5.131 -0.116 0.125 
 (4.870) (3.901) (1.871) 
Constant -2.220 -1.815 4.926* 
  (6.478) (6.025) (2.772) 
Observations 32 33 31 




Table 4: Univariate analysis comparing tax minimization between Experiments 1, 2, and 3 
This table presents the means, frequencies, and p-values from different univariate tests separately comparing legal and 
illegal tax minimization between our three experiments. The variable Legal (Illegal) Tax Base Reduction is measured 
in sheets. Subjects had to key in paper test sheets from a modified multiple-choice test. Earned income was subject to 
taxes but the subjects could choose between zero and six sheets they did not want to declare as taxable income by 
exploiting a legal (an illegal) tax evasion opportunity. The variable Legal (Illegal) Tax Base Reduction FULL equals 
one if the participant decided to avoid (evade) the maximum amount of sheets (six sheets), Legal (Illegal) Tax Base 
Reduction ZERO equals one if the participant decided to avoid (evade) none of the sheets. Experiment 1 is our baseline 
experiment, with no negative detection consequences and no moral priming, Experiment 2 includes negative detection 
consequences, and Experiment 3 includes negative detection consequences and moral priming. Reported p-values are 
from Mann-Whitney U tests (sheets) and Pearson’s chi-squared tests (frequencies). ***, **, and * denote significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
  Legal Tax Base Reduction Illegal Tax Base Reduction
  
Mean FULL ZERO Mean FULL ZERO
(sheets) (%) (%) (sheets) (%) (%)
Experiment 1(risk-free tax 
minimization) 5.34 84.4 3.1 2.50 34.4 46.9 
Experiment 2 (risky tax 
minimization) 3.44 34.4 9.4 3.45 48.5 27.3 
Comparing Experiment 1 with 
Experiment 2 (p-values)
<0.001*** <0.001*** 0.302 0.139 0.248 0.102 
Experiment 3 (risky tax 
minimization with moral 
priming) 
4.06 35.5 3.20 2.81 25.8 32.3 
Comparing Experiment 2 with 
Experiment 3 (p-values)





Table 5: OLS estimation—Tax reduction (in euros) as the dependent variable 
This table presents the regression results from OLS estimations. The three columns represent the results of our three 
different experiments. Experiment 1 is our baseline experiment with no negative detection consequences and no moral 
priming. Experiment 2 includes negative detection consequences and Experiment 3 includes negative detection 
consequences and moral priming. The dependent variable, Tax Reduction, is measured in euros; Evasion equals one 
if the tax minimization opportunity is labeled as illegal tax evasion, Male equals one if the participant is male, and 
Risk is participants’ self-reported risk taking behavior (Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) question, from zero, no risk 
taking, to 10, very high risk taking). We report standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Experiment 1 2 3 
Dependent Variable Tax Reduction Tax Reduction Tax Reduction 
Evasion -0.925*** 0.0288 -0.348* 
 (0.226) (0.216) (0.189) 
Male 0.584** -0.0234 -0.105 
 (0.230) (0.232) (0.190) 
Risk  0.184*** 0.117*** 
  (0.0467) (0.0355) 
Constant 1.346*** 0.227 0.727** 
 (0.205) (0.268) (0.239) 
Observations 64 65 62 




Table 6: Multivariate analysis—Reduced sample analysis 
This table presents the regression results from OLS estimations. The sample is restricted to those participants who 
correctly answered the manipulation check question on the marginal tax rate. The three columns represent the results 
of our three different experiments. Experiment 1 is our baseline experiment with no negative detection consequences 
and no moral priming. Experiment 2 includes negative detection consequences and Experiment 3 includes negative 
detection consequences and moral priming. The dependent variables are Tax base reduction (in sheets, Panel A) and 
Tax reduction (in euros, Panel B). The variable Evasion equals one if the tax minimization opportunity is labeled as 
illegal tax evasion, Male equals one if the participant is male, and Risk is participants’ self-reported risk taking 
behavior (Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) question, from zero, no risk taking, to 10, very high risk taking). We report 
standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: OLS estimation (tax base reduction, in sheets) 
Experiment 1 2 3 
Dependent Variable Tax Reduction Tax Reduction Tax Reduction 
Evasion -3.210*** -0.735 -1.216* 
 (0.550) (0.606) (0.672) 
MTR 3.765** 1.659 -1.117 
 (1.573) (1.640) (1.844) 
Male 0.975* 0.235 0.0880 
 (0.557) (0.635) (0.652) 
Risk  0.590*** 0.389*** 
  (0.120) (0.117) 
Constant 3.079*** -0.533 2.696** 
 (0.800) (0.942) (1.218) 
Observations 56 43 45 
Adj. R-squared 0.460 0.397 0.231 
 
Panel B: OLS estimation (tax reduction, in euros) 
Experiment 1 2 3 
Dependent Variable Tax Reduction Tax Reduction Tax Reduction 
Evasion -1.077*** -0.0324 -0.516** 
 (0.244) (0.245) (0.232) 
Male 0.526** -0.126 -0.105 
 (0.245) (0.259) (0.231) 
Risk  0.197*** 0.119*** 
  (0.0483) (0.0413) 
Constant 1.405*** 0.0420 0.793** 
 (0.211) (0.293) (0.312) 
Observations 56 43 45 





[Formal Analysis of Tax Minimization Behavior] 
This Appendix formalizes a participant’s tax minimization decision for both types of tax minimization 
treatments, legal tax avoidance and illegal tax evasion. We start with the baseline case, which reflects the 
setting in Experiment 1. We then subsequently add penalty risk and examine how an increase in morale 
affects tax minimization in such a setting. 
Let  denote the income before taxes and tax minimization activities. For simplicity, we assume 
proportional income taxation with tax rate	 .20 The tax minimization amount is denoted by  and is 
restricted to a maximal possible amount	 , which is smaller than the true income	 . The binary variable 
∈ 	 0,1  represents the legality of the tax minimization and denotes avoidance (legal,	 1) or evasion 
( 0). We assume that no moral costs arise from legal tax avoidance. Engaging in illegal evasion is 
subject to moral costs denoted by C	  with the properties 0 and	 0. Furthermore, since 
we are mainly interested in the effect of differences in moral costs between legal and illegal behavior, we 
assume that there is no risk of detecting tax evasion in the first experiment. 
The subject’s objective is the maximization of the utility resulting from income after taxes, tax 
minimization, and, in the case of evasion, moral costs. The utility function is increasing in income and 
concave with the properties ’ ⋅ 0 and	 ’’ ⋅ 0. Altogether, one obtains 
max 1 ⋅ 1 ⋅  
such that 	 ∈ 0, . The first-order condition is 




If	 1, then ′ 1 ⋅ ⋅ 0 and the optimal minimization amount ∗ is given by	 ∗
, that is, subjects choose the maximum amount of tax avoidance. 
If	 0, then ∗ is the solution of	 , with	0 ∗ . 
 
Result 1:  If illegal behavior causes higher moral costs than legal behavior does and if there is no detection 
risk, the amount of tax evasion is smaller than the amount of tax avoidance. 
  
                                                 
20  Using a progressive tax rate would not change the implications on the difference between legal and illegal activities 
but would unnecessarily complicate the model. 
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In the next step, we extend the model and introduce the risk of the tax authority auditing the report. In case 
of an audit that occurs with probability	 , the risky tax minimization is not accepted. This holds for well as 
illegal tax minimization. One has to pay back the minimized taxes as well as a fine (interest charges) in the 
case of evasion (avoidance), that is, 1 ⋅ ⋅ . This ensures that we again assume identical financial 
consequences in the case of evasion and avoidance, because the focus of our experiment is the effect of a 
difference in moral costs due to the illegality of evasion on tax minimization. However, since the possibility 
of an audit could influence the moral costs, the corresponding cost function C is a function of the fine and 
the morale costs, that is, , . The individual maximizes the expected utility, which is  
max 	 1 ⋅ 	 ⋅ , 
with 1 ⋅ 1 , , 	 1 1 , ⋅ ⋅ . 
In the following, we assume an interior solution with 	0 ∗ . Moreover, in line with most 
empirical results (e.g., Levy 1994, Chiappori and Paiella 2011, Calvet and Sodini 2014), we assume 
decreasing absolute risk aversion. The first-order condition is 
: 1 ⋅ ⋅ 1 	 ⋅ ⋅ 1 0. 





1 ⋅ ⋅ 1 1 ⋅ ⋅ 1  
	 ⋅ ⋅ 1 ⋅ ⋅ 1 0, 
	 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ 	 ⋅
,	effect without moral costs
	 ⋅ ⋅ 1 ⋅ ⋅
,	moral cost effect (independent of F)
 
	 ⋅ ⋅ 1 ⋅ 1
 the sign of the effect depends on 
1 ⋅ 	 ⋅ ⋅ 1





 denoting absolute risk aversion. 
Case 1.  (risky avoidance): 
Since 1 0, 
⁄
⁄
0. Thus, the introduction (increase) of a potential penalty decreases tax 
avoidance. 
Case 2.  (risky evasion): 
The sign of  depends on the assumption regarding how fines affect moral costs. If the introduction of 
fines does not affect the moral cost of tax evasion ( , 0 , an increase in fines decreases tax evasion. 
This negative effect is amplified if 0 and	 0. However, if we assume that fines could lead to a 
crowding out of tax morale (e.g., Gneezy and Rustichini 2000a, Boyer et al. 2014, Silverman et al. 2014) 
such that 0 and 0, the overall effect of an increase in fines on tax minimization is ambiguous. 
Result 2:  The introduction of penalties reduces the amount of tax avoidance, whereas the effect on tax 
evasion is ambiguous. If fines lead to a crowding out of tax morale	 , 0 , the amount of 
evasion increases and, consequently, the difference between legal and illegal tax minimization 
decreases (and could disappear).  
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In the final step, we model how an increase in tax morale affects Result 2. To this end, we consider total 




Since ⁄ 0 has been calculated above, we need to determine the sign of ⁄ . We obtain 
		 	 1 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ 1 0. 
This leads to the following cases. 








Result 3:  An increase in tax morale does not affect avoidance but does decrease the amount of evasion. 
Therefore, the amount of legal tax avoidance is expected to be higher than the amount of illegal 





[Instructions from the first experiment] 
By participating in this experiment, you have the opportunity to earn money. The experiment serves to 
examine economic decision making. The remuneration you will receive at the end of the experiment 
depends on your decisions concerning your labor supply. Please read the instructions carefully and 
attentively. 
Should you have further questions, please contact the experimenter. 
1. Anonymity 
We want to inform you that throughout the experiment you are not allowed to talk to the other 
participants or leave your workstation. To start the experiment, you received a table tennis ball with 
an identification number. Please carefully keep the ball. You will need it to identify yourself when 
the remuneration is paid. The identification number enables you to hide your true identity from the 
experimenter and the other participants. 
2. Set up of the experiment 
Labor supply decision, questionnaire part 1, working phase, and questionnaire part 2. 
You begin with a trial round to become acquainted with the task. We then ask you to submit a mandatory 
labor supply and fill out part 1 of the questionnaire. Afterward you will have to fulfill your mandatory labor 
supply. The phase will end with another questionnaire. Finally, you will receive your remuneration 
according to your performance. 
1. Trial round 
Your task is to digitize the answers marked on the sheets in front of you into an entry form on the 
computer. The sheets contain the answers from a multiple-choice exam. In a first step we ask you 
to enter the number of the sheet, which can be found at the top left corner of the page, into the field 
provided for it and press Next. Afterward, you will see the entry form for the sheet. It will be set 
up similarly to the hard copy of the sheet in front of you. Please translate the marked answers for 
all of the 60 questions into the entry form on the computer. When you have finished translating the 
sheet, please press Next. 
 
The computer will calculate the time you need to type up the single sheet. This processing time will 
be displayed for you. Based on the processing time, you will then be able to estimate how many 
sheets you want to digitize for you mandatory labor supply. 
 
2. Determining your labor supply 
You became acquainted with your task during the trial round and know your approximate 
processing time by now. We now want to know how many sheets you will digitize. You will submit 
a mandatory labor supply, which you will have to fulfill afterward. 
 
Please note: Only if you fulfill your labor supply will you get compensated for your work. 
 
For every correctly digitized sheet you will receive 10 ECU (currency during the experiment) as 
a gross wage (10 ECU equal 0.70 euros). 
 
You have to pay taxes: The first four correctly digitized sheets remain tax free (equals 40 ECU). 
Starting with the fifth correctly digitized sheet, you will have to pay a tax of 30 percent for each 
additional sheet. Starting with the 29th correctly digitized sheet, you will have to pay a tax of 65 
percent for each additional sheet. 
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The tax will remain in the budget of the XXX Business School. You will be paid out your net 





By using a slider, you can determine how many sheets you will correctly digitize. You can adjust 
the slider as often as you want. Depending on the slider’s position, the following information will 
be displayed to you according to the tax system: 
‐ Additional gross wage (before taxes) in ECU if you digitize an additional sheet correctly, 
‐ Additional tax burden in percent if you digitize an additional sheet correctly, 
‐ Additional net wage (after taxes) in ECU if you digitize an additional sheet correctly. 
[Legal Tax Avoidance treatment only: You can legally reduce your tax burden by using a loophole 
in the tax code. This will reduce the number of sheets to be taxed. Your tax burden will thereby be 
reduced. You will find an additional slider to determine the use of the legal loophole. The more you 
use the loophole, the more sheets will not be taxed. Up to six sheets will not be taxed when fully 
using the loophole You can adjust the slider as often as you want.] 
[Illegal Tax Evasion treatment only: In principle, you have to honestly pay tax on your 
compensation. However, you can illegally reduce your tax burden through tax evasion. This will 
reduce the number of sheets to be taxed. Your tax burden will thereby be reduced. You will find an 
additional slider to determine the use of illegal tax evasion. The more you use tax evasion, the more 
sheets will not be taxed. Up to six sheets will not be taxed when fully using illegal tax evasion. 


















































If you don’t want to make further adjustments, please submit your mandatory labor supply by 
pressing Next. Subsequent correction is not possible from this point on. 
3. Questionnaire part 1 
Please read the questions attentively and answer them conscientiously. Your answers are an 
important component of our experiment and will be analyzed anonymously. Afterward press Next. 
 
4. Fulfilling your labor supply 
You became acquainted with your task during the trial round and submitted a binding labor supply, 
which you will have to fulfill now. After every sheet you will be informed whether you digitized it 
correctly or not. The number of sheets left to be correctly digitized to fulfill your labor supply will 
be displayed to you. Please enter every sheet only once, since the repeated entry of a sheet number 
will not be considered and therefore not remunerated. 
 
5. Questionnaire part 2 
Please read the questions attentively and answer them conscientiously. Your answers are an 




In summary, you will see an evaluation of your labor supply (remuneration after taxes converted 
into euros). By then the experiment is over. Please press Continue for your payment file to be 
created. Quietly pack your belongings and come to the front to be paid. You will receive your 
remuneration after taxes from the working phase according to your fulfilled labor supply decision. 
After carefully reading and understanding these instructions, please start the experiment independently. 
Should you have any questions, do not hesitate to ask the experimenter. 
 





[Additional instructions for the second experiment] 
[Legal Tax Avoidance only: Whether use of the loophole will be accepted by the tax authority is 
unknown. 
 
 Case 1:  The use of the legal loophole is accepted. The probability of this   
   happening is 75%. 
 Case 2:  The use of the legal loophole is not accepted. The probability of  
   this happening is 25%. In this case you will have to pay the so-far   
   unpaid taxes (on a maximum of six sheets). In addition, you will   
   have to pay interest amounting to half of the subsequent tax    
   payment. 
 
The two possible outcomes are randomly selected. To arrive at a decision, you will have to choose one out 
of four table tennis balls by the end of the experiment. Three of the four balls will be labeled Case 1, while 
one of them will be labeled Case 2. Depending on the slider’s position, the following information will be 
displayed to you according to the tax system. 
The effect of a deferment of the upper slider by one sheet to the right (You digitize one additional sheet  
what happens?): 
  the amount of the additional pre-tax and pre interest income in ECU, 
 the amount of the additional tax burden in ECU, 
 the amount of the additional interest in ECU, 
 the amount of the additional post-tax and post interest income in ECU. 
 
The effect of a deferment of the lower slider by one sheet to the right (You extent the use of the legal 
loophole by one additional sheet  what happens?): 
 the amount of the additional tax savings in ECU, 
 the amount of the additional interest in ECU. 
The presentation of the effects is separated for Case 1 and Case 2. 
In the following 3 fictitious numerical examples will be presented. The presentation of the examples equals 
that of the numbers on your screen during your working decision. Please try to comprehend the examples. 





Number of sheets specified by slide control 
(labor supply) 
10 sheets 
Extent of the use of legal loophole in sheets 
as specified by slide control 
0 sheets 
 Case 1: Loophole is 
being accepted 
(probability = 75%) 
Case 2: Loophole is 
not accepted 
(probability = 25%) 
Effect of a deferment of the upper slide control by one sheet to the right (what happens if you 
digitize one additional sheet): 
Additional pre-tax and pre interest income 
in ECU  
10 ECU 10 ECU 
Additional tax burden in ECU 3.00 ECU 3.00 ECU 
Additional interest in ECU  0.00 ECU 
Additional post-tax and post interest 
income in ECU 
7.00 ECU 7.00 ECU 
Effect of a deferment of the lower slide control by one sheet to the right (what happens if you 
extent the use of the legal loophole by one additional sheet): 
Additional tax savings in ECU 3.00 ECU  
Additional interest in ECU  1.50 ECU 
In case of a sole deferment of the upper slide control by one sheet to the right, additional effects are identical 
for Case 1 and Case 2. Your additional income for the 11th sheet amounts to 7.00 ECU (post-tax and post-
interest). 
In case of a sole deferment of the lower slide control by one sheet to the right (the use of the legal loophole 
now comprises one sheet), you save 3.00 ECU of taxes in Case 1 (tax rate = 30%) while in Case 2 these 
savings are lost and you have to pay additional interest of 1.50 ECU (half of the subsequent tax payment). 
 
Example 2 
Number of sheets specified by slide control 
(labor supply) 
4 sheet 
Extent of the use of legal loophole in sheets 
as specified by slide control 
1 sheet 
 Case 1: Loophole is 
being accepted 
(probability = 75%) 
Case 2: Loophole is 
not accepted 
(probability = 25%) 
Effect of a deferment of the upper slide control by one sheet to the right (what happens if you 
digitize one additional sheet): 
Additional pre-tax and pre interest income 
in ECU  
10 ECU 10 ECU 
Additional tax burden in ECU 0.00 ECU 3.00 ECU 
Additional interest in ECU  1.50 ECU 
Additional post-tax and post interest 
income in ECU 
10.00 ECU 5.50 ECU 
Effect of a deferment of the lower slide control by one sheet to the right (what happens if you 
extent the use of the legal loophole by one additional sheet): 
Additional tax savings in ECU 0.00 ECU  
Additional interest in ECU  0.00 ECU 
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In general, without using the legal loophole, an additionally digitized sheet (5th sheet) would be taxed with 
30% in case of a sole deferment of the upper slide control by one sheet to the right. But due to the use of 
the legal loophole one sheet remains tax free in Case 1, the additional tax burden for the 5th sheet therefore 
amounts to 0.00 ECU. In Case 2 the use of the legal loophole is not accepted. As a consequence the 5th 
sheet is taxed at a tax rate of 30%. In addition interest of 1.50 ECU (half of the subsequent tax payment) 
has to be paid. 
In case of a sole deferment of the lower slide control no additional tax savings arise in Case 1 as all 4 sheets 
are already taxed at a tax rate of 0%. Respectively in Case 2 no additional interest arises. 
 
Example 3 
Number of sheets specified by slide control 
(labor supply) 
40 sheets 
Extent of the use of legal loophole in sheets 
as specified by slide control 
5 sheets 
 Case 1: Loophole is 
being accepted 
(probability = 75%) 
Case 2: Loophole is 
not accepted 
(probability = 25%) 
Effect of a deferment of the upper slide control by one sheet to the right (what happens if you 
digitize one additional sheet): 
Additional pre-tax and pre interest income 
in ECU  
10 ECU 10 ECU 
Additional tax burden in ECU 6.50 ECU 6.50 ECU 
Additional interest in ECU  0.00 ECU 
Additional post-tax and post interest 
income in ECU 
3.50 ECU 3.50 ECU 
Effect of a deferment of the lower slide control by one sheet to the right (what happens if you 
extent the use of the legal loophole by one additional sheet): 
Additional tax savings in ECU 6.50 ECU  
Additional interest in ECU  3.25 ECU 
In case of sole deferment of the upper slide control by one sheet to the right the additional (41st) sheet is 
always taxed at a tax rate of 65%. Additional interest due to the 41st sheet does not arise in Case 2 as the 
overall subsequent tax payment remains unaffected by the 41st sheet. 
In case of a sole deferment of the lower slide control by one sheet to the right, tax savings on the additional 
(6th) sheet of 6.50 ECU arise in Case 1. In Case 2 these savings are lost while additional interest of 3.25 




[Illegal Tax Evasion only: Whether a potential tax evasion is detected by the tax authority is unknown: 
 
 Case 1:  The tax evasion remains undetected. Probability for this to    
   happen is 75%. 
 
 Case 2:  The tax evasion is being detected. Probability for this to happen   
   is 25%. In this case you will have to pay the so far unpaid taxes    
   (tax on a maximum of 6 sheets) plus in addition you will have to   
   pay a penalty amounting to half of the subsequent payment. 
 
Which of the 2 possible outcomes might be the case is randomly selected. To arrive at a decision you will 
have to choose one out of four table tennis balls by the end of the experiment. Three of the four balls will 
be labeled “Case 1” while one out of them will be labeled “Case 2.” Depending on the slider’s position the 
following information will be displayed to you according to the tax system: 
The effect of a deferment of the upper slider by one sheet to the right (You digitize one additional sheet  
what happens?): 
  the amount of the additional pre-tax and pre-penalty income in ECU, 
 the amount of the additional tax burden in ECU, 
 the amount of the additional penalty in ECU, 
 the amount of the additional post-tax and post-penalty income in ECU. 
 
The effect of a deferment of the lower slider by one sheet to the right (You extent the tax evasion by one 
additional sheet  what happens?): 
 the amount of the additional tax savings in ECU, 
 the amount of the additional penalty in ECU. 
The presentation of the effects is separated for Case 1 and Case 2. 
In the following 3 fictitious numerical examples will be presented. The presentation of the examples equals 
that of the numbers on your screen during your working decision. Please try to comprehend the examples. 




Number of sheets specified by slide control 
(labor supply) 
10 sheets 
Extent of illegal tax evasion in sheets as 
specified by slide control 
0 sheets 
 Case 1: tax evasion 
remains undetected 
(probability = 75%) 
Case 2: tax evasion is 
detected (probability 
= 25%) 
Effect of a deferment of the upper slide control by one sheet to the right (what happens if you 
digitize one additional sheet):  
Additional pre-tax and pre-penalty income 
in ECU  
10 ECU 10 ECU 
Additional tax burden in ECU 3.00 ECU 3.00 ECU 
Additional penalty in ECU  0.00 ECU 
Additional post-tax and post-penalty 
income in ECU 
7.00 ECU 7.00 ECU 
Effect of a deferment of the lower slide control by one sheet to the right (what happens if you 
extent the illegal tax evasion by one additional sheet): 
Additional tax savings in ECU 3.00 ECU  
Additional penalty in ECU  1.50 ECU 
In case of a sole deferment of the upper slide control by one sheet to the right, additional effects are identical 
for Case 1 and Case 2. Your additional income for the 11th sheet amounts to 7.00 ECU (post-tax and post-
penalty). 
In case of a sole deferment of the lower slide control by one sheet to the right (the illegal tax evasion now 
comprises one sheet), you save 3.00 ECU of taxes in Case 1 (tax rate = 30%) while in Case 2 these savings 
are lost and you have to pay an additional penalty of 1.50 ECU (half of the subsequent tax payment). 
 
Example 2 
Number of sheets specified by slide control 
(labor supply) 
4 sheets 
Extent of illegal tax evasion in sheets as 
specified by slide control 
1 sheet 
 Case 1: tax evasion 
remains undetected 
(probability = 75%) 
Case 2: tax evasion is 
detected (probability 
=25%) 
Effect of a deferment of the upper slide control by one sheet to the right (what happens if you 
digitize one additional sheet): 
Additional pre-tax and pre-penalty income 
in ECU 
10 ECU 10 ECU 
Additional tax burden in ECU 0.00 ECU 3.00 ECU 
Additional penalty in ECU  1.50 ECU 
Additional post-tax and post-penalty 
income in ECU 
10.00 ECU 5.50 ECU 
Effect of a deferment of the lower slide control by one sheet to the right (what happens if you 
extent the illegal tax evasion by one additional sheet): 
Additional tax savings in ECU 0.00 ECU  
Additional penalty in ECU  0.00 ECU 
 
43 
In general, without illegal tax evasion, an additionally digitized sheet (5th sheet) would be taxed with 30% 
in case of a sole deferment of the upper slide control by one sheet to the right. But due to the use of illegal 
tax evasion one sheet remains tax free in Case 1, the additional tax burden for the 5th sheet therefore amounts 
to 0.00 ECU. In Case 2 the use of illegal tax evasion is being detected. As a consequence the 5th sheet is 
taxed at a tax rate of 30%. In addition the penalty of 1.50 ECU (half of the subsequent tax payment) has to 
be paid. 
In case of a sole deferment of the lower slide control no additional tax savings arise in Case 1 as all 4 sheets 
are already taxed at a tax rate of 0%. Respectively in Case 2 no additional penalty arises. 
 
Example 3 
Number of sheets specified by slide control 
(labor supply) 
40 sheets 
Extent of illegal tax evasion in sheets as 
specified by slide control 
5 sheets 
 Case 1: tax evasion 
remains undetected 
(probability = 75%) 
Case 2: tax evasion is 
detected (probability 
=25%) 
Effect of a deferment of the upper slide control by one sheet to the right (what happens if you 
digitize one additional sheet): 
Additional pre-tax and pre-penalty income 
in ECU 
10 ECU 10 ECU 
Additional tax burden in ECU 6.50 ECU 6.50 ECU 
Additional penalty in ECU  0.00 ECU 
Additional post-tax and post-penalty 
income in ECU 
3.50 ECU 3.50 ECU 
Effect of a deferment of the lower slide control by one sheet to the right (what happens if you 
extent the illegal tax evasion by one additional sheet): 
Additional tax savings in ECU 6.50 ECU  
Additional penalty in ECU  3.25 ECU 
In case of sole deferment of the upper slide control by one sheet to the right the additional (41st) sheet is 
always taxed at a tax rate of 65%. An additional penalty due to the 41st sheet does not arise in Case 2 as the 
overall subsequent tax payment remains unaffected by the 41st sheet. 
In case of a sole deferment of the lower slide control by one sheet to the right, tax savings on the additional 
(6th) sheet of 6.50 ECU arise in Case 1. In Case 2 these savings are lost while an additional penalty of 3.25 






[Additional instructions for the third experiment] 
Please enter your identification number and PIN and press “continue” at the screen in front of you. You 
will now see 6 quotes. Your task is to attentively read the 6 quotes and describe the similarities of the 6 
quotes in your own words. Therefore, please use the attached sheet. When you have finished your task 
please press “Next.” 
The first phase of the experiment will then be over. 
Please hand over the sheet at the end of the experiment (during the remuneration phase). 
For the first phase of the experiment you will receive a remuneration of 5 Euro. 
 
After attentively reading and understanding these instructions you can start the experiment. 





Sheet to write down the common ground of the 6 quotes 
Udanavarga 5:18 
“Hurt not others in ways that you yourself would find hurtful.” 
 
Matthew 7:12 
“Do to others what you want them to do to you. This is the meaning of the law of Moses and the teaching 
of the prophets.” 
 
Confucius 
“Never impose on others what you would not choose for yourself." 
 
Mahabharata Anusasana Parva, Section CXIII, Verse 8 
“One should never do that to another which one regards as injurious to one’s own self. This, in brief, is the 
rule of dharma. Other behavior is due to selfish desires.” 
 
Hadith 13 
 “None of you truly believes until he wishes for his brother what he wishes for himself.” 
 
Talmud Shabbat 31a 
“That which is hateful to you, do not do to your fellow. That is the whole Torah; the rest is the explanation; 
go and learn it.”] 
 









Appendix V: Questionnaire Parts 1 and 2 
Questionnaire Part 1 of 2 
Please tell me, for each of the following, whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or 
something in between: 
 Claiming state benefits which you are not entitled to 
 Cheating on tax if you have the chance 
 Lying in your own interest 
 Someone accepting a bribe in the course of their duties 
 Avoiding taxes by using legal means if you have the chance 
Radio buttons from 1, never justified, to 10, always justified. 
How fair do you consider the tax system applied during the experiment on a scale of 1, very unfair, to 10, 
very fair? 
[Experiments 2 and 3 only: Are you generally a risk-seeking person or do you try to avoid risk?  
Radio buttons from 0, no risk taking, to 10, high risk taking] 
[Experiments 2 and 3 only: What religion do you belong to?] 
[Experiments 2 and 3 only: In the past 12 months, how often did you attend religious services?] 
Questionnaire Part 2 of 2 
Have you participated in a similar experiment (labor supply decision) before? 
Were the instructions understandable? 
Please tell us the amount of the remuneration (wage) before taxes per sheet in ECU. 
Reminder: [Legal Tax Avoidance only: You digitized xxx sheets correctly and xxx sheets were not taxed 
due to the use of the loophole in the tax code.] [Illegal Tax Evasion only: You digitized xxx sheets correctly 
and xxx sheets were not taxed due to the use of tax evasion.] Please tell us the tax burden in percent 
regarding the last sheet you digitized. 
Reminder: [Legal Tax Avoidance only: You digitized xxx sheets correctly and xxx sheets were not taxed 
due to the use of the loophole in the tax code.] [Illegal Tax Evasion only: You digitized xxx sheets correctly 
and xxx sheets were not taxed due to the use of tax evasion.] Please tell us the tax burden in percent 
regarding all the sheets you digitized. 
How would you rate your tax law knowledge on a scale of 1, no knowledge, to 9, exceptional knowledge? 
How old are you? 
Are you female or male? 
In which course of study are you enrolled? 
0 = Architecture and Landscape; 1 = Construction Engineering and Geodesy; 2 = Electrical Engineering 
and Computer Science; 3 = Law; 4 = Mechanical Engineering; 5 = Mathematics and Physics; 6 = Natural 
Sciences; 7 = Philosophy; 8 = Business and Economics; 9 = other; 10 = I am not a student 
What qualification are you aiming for currently? 
0 = Bachelor; 1 = Master; 2 = Diploma; 3 = Magister [comparable to Master of Arts]; 4 = 1st State 
Examination; 5 = 2nd State Examination; 6 = Doctoral Degree; 7 = other 
In which academic semester are you? 
47 
What is your marital status? 
0 = marriage/registered partnership; 1 = unmarried; 2 = divorced/widowed 
Do you have children? 
What is your monthly disposable income (after rent, approximately)? 
0 = <300 EUR; 1 = 301–600 EUR; 2 = 601–900 EUR; 3 = 901–1,200 EUR; 4 = >1,200 EUR 




[Online survey questions] 
Paul Kruger is the owner of a successful travel agency. Last month, he realized 5,000 EUR as extraordinary 
income for the organization of a “Special Event.” 
[Risky Legal Tax Avoidance only: He knows that he can legally reduce the tax burden related to his 
extraordinary income (65% * 5,000 EUR = 3,250 EUR) by using a loophole in the tax code. Whether the 
use of the loophole will be accepted by the tax authority is unknown. Experts estimate the probability of 
acceptance at 75%. If the use of the loophole is not accepted (25% probability), Paul Kruger will have to 
pay taxes amounting to 3,250 EUR plus interest amounting to 1,625 EUR to the tax authorities. 
Paul Kruger opts to use the legal loophole.] 
[Certain Tax Avoidance only: He knows that he can legally reduce the tax burden related to his 
extraordinary income (65% * 5,000 EUR = 3,250 EUR) by using a loophole in the tax code. 
Paul Kruger opts to use the legal loophole.] 
[Risky Tax Evasion only: In principal, Paul Kruger has to honestly pay the tax on his income. However, he 
can illegally reduce the tax burden related to his extraordinary income (65% * 5,000 EUR = 3,250 EUR) 
through tax evasion. From a reliable source, he knows that there is a 75% probability the tax authority will 
not detect the tax evasion. If the tax evasion is detected (25% probability), Paul Kruger will have to pay 
taxes amounting to 3,250 EUR plus a penalty amounting to 1,625 EUR to the tax authorities. 
Paul Kruger opts to use the illegal tax evasion.] 
[Certain Tax Evasion only: In principal, Paul Kruger has to honestly pay the tax on his income. However, 
he can illegally reduce the tax burden related to his extraordinary income (65% * 5,000 EUR = 3,250 EUR) 
through tax evasion. From a reliable source, he knows that the tax authority will not detect the tax evasion. 
Paul Kruger opts to use the illegal tax evasion.] 
 
Please tell me whether you think that Paul Kruger’s behavior can always be justified, never be justified, or 
something in between: 
Never be justified                  Always be justified 
1      2      3      4      5      6     7      8      9      10 
 
 
